Editorial: Politics of rights - Pema Thinley (released June 1999)

Politics of rights
Editorial by Mr. Pema Thinley (released June 1999)


The profound Tibetan belief, the raison d'être of our professedly non-violent struggle, that truth and justice will ultimately prevail represents only half the truth about survival in this world. A more wholesome truth seems to be that unless backed or complemented by appropriately potent coercive elements, not necessarily violent, a cause, no matter how noble and sacred, cannot move beyond being a mere intention. All the public relations exercises that predominantly and necessarily determine the mode of carrying out a non-violent struggle remain by themselves mere manners of expressing noble aspirations and sentiments, depending on whether you are an embodiment or a supporter of such a cause. 

A noble cause waged by non-violent means in the name of the truth depends for success upon its capacity to stir the conscience of those whose minds are sought to be subdued or won over. Unfortunately the truth about human rights and violations thereof in today’s world of international diplomacy and complex layers and circuits of parochial national interests is highly subjective. No one brought home the truth about this truth with more telling effect than South Africa’s President Nelson Mandela during his recent visit to communist China. 

During his quarter century of incarceration in apartheid South Africa on an alleged murder charge, the whole free world stood behind him. He became the most famous political prisoner in the world and the inspiration for all other subjugated peoples. It was realistic therefore to expect that upon his release from jail and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, Mandela would be the last person to compromise on any people’s rights. Unfortunately this was not to be the case. Mandela the President of South Africa rode the rough shod over Mandela the archetypal symbol of crusade for the rights of the oppressed. 

The economic and political interests of South Africa in having cordial relations with a powerful communist China, the worst and certainly the most pervasive violators of human rights in the world even to this day, was to him much, much more important than the human rights and democratic aspirations of peoples in such strange, distant lands as Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, China, etc. That is why his expressions of admiration for the communist regime was so explicitly forthright, without an iota of qualification or stammer of hesitation. ‘I am happy to have chosen to end my political career by visiting China,’ the official China Daily newspaper on 8 May quoted him as saying. Mr. Mandela is to retire as the President of South Africa in early June this year. 

The South African President played music to the communist Chinese ears, saying he had no advice for mainland dissidents and no criticism of Beijing’s rights record. According to news reports on 8 May, Mr Mandela repeatedly declined to criticise Beijing for jailing dissidents and other abuses, saying instead that he was not prepared to interfere in China’s domestic affairs. Whither the universality of human rights. And he called his trip ‘success,’ though no trade deals or accords had been signed. 

No one can, of course, condemn or praise Mandela without making some value judgement that would pit the basically economic and to some extent politico-diplomatic interests of one’s own country against the human rights, no matter how fundamental, of peoples in other, alien lands. Leaders of almost all the countries of the world are not doing it any much differently. Only they pay lip service to human rights in varying degrees of criticism of the communist regime’s record and attitude.

Politicking with human rights does not end with the question whether gross and systematic rights violations are being condemned in concrete, coercive terms or acquiesced to in a conspiracy of silence. The states most responsible for perpetrating rights violations are the ones most combative in seeking positions on the various UN rights monitoring bodies. States whose leaders knew nothing about UN human rights system overnight become members of UN rights bodies upon learning that their records had been subjects of discussion at these fora. Mention any UN rights monitoring body today and you will almost certainly find the very odd presence of a Chinese delegation there—China bulls in UN rights shops! I have personally witnessed a UN working group meeting in Geneva where the Chinese delegation led the violators’ cohort in opposing, diluting, negating, qualifying, etc, each and every draft provision to ensure that a UN declaration on the rights of human rights defenders was delayed and diluted or neutralised as much as possible. Even on such bodies as the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, or the various treaty bodies, such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee Against Torture, Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, etc, etc, the supposedly independent human rights experts from China are seen blatantly defensive of the indefensible: their government’s reprehensible human rights record in a manifestly partisan manner.

Thus, with or without Mandela, attitude towards human rights will always be subjective and political. Likewise, human rights violations by the Chinese government will continue whether or not it is condemned by individual countries and intergovernmental bodies, such as the UN Commission on Human Rights. After all, the violations are only symptoms of a government whose authority is threatened at home but whose power and influence is feared abroad. 

Dawa T. Norbu: A Struggle in Travail (February/March 1975)

A Struggle in Travail
Editorial by Mr. Dawa T. Norbu (February/March 1975)

      It is now twenty-five years since the Chinese invasion, and sixteen years since the Lhasa Uprising when China turned Tibet, for all practical purposes, into a Chinese province. During this period Tibet has witnessed the biggest upheavals in her history, and Tibetan response to such challenges has also changed according to changing circumstances and situations.

      It is only inevitable that the old-fashioned Khampa-type of resistance should come to an end. For one thing that gallant but cumbersome generation is ageing, but more importantly the Tibetans have acquired in the course of their protracted struggle valuable experience. They have learned new ideas and new techniques of guerilla warfare. Now with the emergence of a new generation of Tibetan freedom fighters both in and outside Tibet, the whole conception of Tibetan nationalism has changed. If the ageing generation fought for the glory of their faith, the new generation is at pains to view the struggle in terms of nationalism as it is prevalent in the third wolrd today. Although there is some confusion at present as it usually happens during a transition, the new conception of Tibetan national liberation struggle has the potential to acquire greater clarity and in due course to crystalise into something concrete.

      One of the tragedies of the Tibetan struggle has been the agonising dilemma between a total armed struggle and a ‘peaceful means’. In the past both the nature of the Tibetan leadership and prudence preferred a ‘peaceful means’. As such the struggle has been characterised by a conspicuous lack of hatred against the enemy; at best it is a strange love-hate struggle. It is a monumental tribute to the all-embracing compassion preached by Tibetan Buddhism. But while praiseworthy in the realm of ethics, it has played a significant negative role in the Tibetan freedom struggle.

      While Muslim leaders can declare jahed against their national enemies, the Dalai Lama has made no such declaration: he has so far stuck to his belief. His stand is to be defended both on grounds of pragmatism and his non-violent creed. While Arafat forced his way into the UNO and occupy a seat in the world body, the Tibetans in exile continue to petition and pray. It is true the Palestinian Liberation Organisation is being greatly aided and armed by the Arab countries, while the Tibetans are not so fortunate. But unless a movement is at least moving in some direction and unless its leaders can demonstrate their capacity and show promising results, no external aid can be expected.

      No power wants to be involved uselessly in a cause that shows no substantive results. It is up to those who are commited to a cause to convince other friendly powers by their demonstrative results, not by pleading.

      At the same time to ignore the serious handicaps of the Tibetan struggle would be unfair. In Tibet, for example, although the nature and dialectic of the struggle has changed remarkably for the better, the young freedom fighters face greater difficulties than ever before. The Chinese occupation troops are deeply entrenched and Chinese colonial power is considerably consolidated during the past 25 years. This means that the Tibetan populace is kept under an efficient military subjugation and the chances of revolt are minimised by terror. Added to all this is that the Tibetan population is scattered over a continental area which makes mass mobilisation difficult. All thesepartly explain the phenomena that resistance exists mostly in pockets and generally lacking co-ordination.

      But the redeeming feature of the new trend is that it is not the old Tibetans who have now more or less resigned to their fate but the young, many of whom are educated in China, who are now spearheading a more effective, though on a smaller and less colourful scale, resistance against the Chinese overlordship in

      Tibet. Their perception of nationalism is clear and simple: Tibet belongs to the Tibetan people. And the dialectic of their struggle is that they see an ‘antagonistic contradiction’ between what they have learnt in Chinese socialist schools and what the Chinese actually practise in Tibet.

      There is nothing surprising about the emerging new trend in Tibetan resistance against the Chinese. The recent history of Marxism indicates the Marxist ideology in a closed society in which it must necessarily function if it is to paradoxically succeed, has promoted more nationalism and chauvinism than proletarian internationalism. Sadly proletarian internationalism and exploitation-free society remain as romantic and remote as the pious goals of various religions. Such lofty goals are reverendly shelved away in the time future and therefore do not concern much except for occasional invocations. What matters most and hence shapespolicy thinking is what matters now and here: ‘national interest’.